Behavioural Finance - Cognitive Biases in Investment Decisions

By EC Assets Research Team, Behavioural Strategy · Published · Updated

Behavioural Finance: Behavioural finance studies how psychological biases affect investor decisions and market outcomes. The field documents systematic deviations from rational expected-utility decision-making that produce predictable market inefficiencies and individual investor errors.

What Behavioural Finance Is

Behavioural finance studies how the way people actually think affects financial decisions and market prices. Its starting point is Kahneman and Tversky (1979), whose prospect theory showed that choices under risk depart from the expected-utility model in systematic ways: people judge outcomes as gains and losses relative to a reference point rather than as levels of wealth, feel losses more strongly than gains, and overweight small probabilities.

The field has two strands. One documents how individuals and institutions make costly decisions. The other asks whether those errors move prices, given that arbitrage against them is risky and needs capital. This entry concentrates on the first, which is where investors have the most control.

How It Works

Tversky and Kahneman (1992) estimated a value function that is concave for gains, convex for losses and steeper for losses, with a loss-aversion coefficient of about 2.25 and a curvature of 0.88 on both sides. Benartzi and Thaler (1995) combined loss aversion with frequent evaluation, which they called myopic loss aversion, and showed that it can explain why investors demand a large equity premium: the more often a portfolio is checked, the more often it shows a loss.

The best-documented biases in investing are:

Bias Evidence Typical cost
Disposition effect Investors realise gains more readily than losses (Shefrin and Statman 1985; Odean 1998) Selling winners that keep rising, holding losers
Overconfidence The most active households earned 11.4 percent a year against 17.9 percent for the market, 1991 to 1996 (Barber and Odean 2000) Trading costs and poor timing
Return chasing Plan sponsors hire after strong returns and fire after weak ones (Goyal and Wahal 2008) Switching costs with no gain in performance
Myopic loss aversion Frequent evaluation raises the felt risk of equities (Benartzi and Thaler 1995) Too little in risky assets, selling after drawdowns
Herding and anchoring Following peers or initial reference prices Crowded positions, slow reaction to news

The first four rows summarise the cited studies; herding and anchoring are widely described but harder to measure cleanly.

The pattern behind return chasing is worth spelling out. Goyal and Wahal (2008) studied US plan sponsors and found that managers were hired after large positive excess returns over the previous three years, yet their excess returns after hiring were indistinguishable from zero. Had sponsors stayed with the managers they fired, they would have done no worse than with the replacements.

Worked Example

Take a coin flip that wins 150 or loses 100. Its expected value is +25, but with the 1992 parameters its prospect value is 0.5 × 82.2 - 0.5 × 129.5 = -23.6, so the bet is rejected. The gain has to reach about 251 before the flip becomes acceptable.

The same coefficient applied to the S&P 500 shows why evaluation frequency matters. The table uses a simplified linear version, in which each horizon's value is the average gain minus 2.25 times the average loss:

Evaluation period Periods Share with a loss Average return Loss-averse value
Day 12,857 46.5% 0.04% -0.39%
Month 611 37.8% 0.83% -0.77%
Quarter 203 31.0% 2.51% -0.02%
Year 50 24.0% 10.28% 6.77%

S&P 500 price index (Cboe), no dividends, non-overlapping calendar periods from January 1975 to December 2025; value = average gain - 2.25 × average loss, both averaged over all periods.

Checked monthly, equities feel like a losing proposition at -0.77 percent a month, even though they returned 0.83 percent a month on average; checked yearly, the same holding feels clearly worthwhile, at +6.77 percent a year. Benartzi and Thaler, comparing stocks with bonds rather than with zero, put the evaluation period that fits the historical equity premium at about one year. Over rolling ten-year windows since 1985, only 5.7 percent ended lower, all of them windows ending between October 2008 and January 2011.

When It Applies (and Limitations)

Parameters vary. The 2.25 coefficient is a median estimate from experimental choices; loss aversion differs across people, stakes and settings.

Bias or risk? Patterns such as momentum and value have behavioural explanations, but risk-based explanations compete with them, and both may play a part.

Limits to arbitrage. Mispricing can persist because correcting it is risky and needs capital, so knowing that a bias exists does not make it profitable to trade against.

Awareness is not enough. Knowing about a bias does little to remove it; rules and structure work better than good intentions.

The example is simplified. The table ignores dividends, which would make every horizon look better, and uses a linear value function; it illustrates the effect rather than estimating it.

Why It Matters for Institutional Investors

Evaluation horizon. Reviewing performance over horizons that match the strategy, rather than monthly, reduces the pressure to sell after declines; the maximum drawdown entry shows how deep normal declines can be, and the drawdown recovery calculator how long recoveries take.

Rules set in advance. Rebalancing bands and risk limits agreed before a crisis replace decisions made under stress, and mechanically buy what has fallen. A strategic asset allocation set for long horizons serves the same purpose.

Manager hiring and firing. The evidence on return chasing argues for judging managers on process and long records rather than on the last three years; see manager selection.

Committee process. Written investment cases, a named dissenting view and reviews that compare outcomes with the original reasoning reduce groupthink and hindsight bias.

Measuring the cost. Comparing dollar-weighted with time-weighted returns shows what timing decisions cost. Dichev (2007) found that investors' dollar-weighted returns on NYSE and AMEX stocks were 1.3 percent a year lower than buy-and-hold returns from 1926 to 2002.

References

  1. Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk. Econometrica, 47(2), 263-291.
  2. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5(4), 297-323.
  3. Benartzi, S., & Thaler, R. H. (1995). Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(1), 73-92.
  4. Shefrin, H., & Statman, M. (1985). The Disposition to Sell Winners Too Early and Ride Losers Too Long: Theory and Evidence. Journal of Finance, 40(3), 777-790.
  5. Odean, T. (1998). Are Investors Reluctant to Realize Their Losses? Journal of Finance, 53(5), 1775-1798.
  6. Barber, B. M., & Odean, T. (2000). Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The Common Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors. Journal of Finance, 55(2), 773-806.
  7. Goyal, A., & Wahal, S. (2008). The Selection and Termination of Investment Management Firms by Plan Sponsors. Journal of Finance, 63(4), 1805-1847.
  8. Dichev, I. D. (2007). What Are Stock Investors' Actual Historical Returns? Evidence from Dollar-Weighted Returns. American Economic Review, 97(1), 386-401.

Frequently asked questions

What is behavioural finance?

The study of how psychology shapes financial decisions and market prices. It builds on evidence, starting with Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory (1979), that people depart from the expected-utility model in systematic ways, and asks what those departures cost investors and whether they move prices.

What is loss aversion?

The tendency to weigh losses more heavily than gains of the same size. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) estimated the ratio at about 2.25. It explains why many people reject favourable bets and why checking a portfolio often makes risky assets feel worse than they are.

What is the disposition effect?

The tendency to sell investments that have risen and hold those that have fallen. Odean (1998) found that investors at a US discount broker realised 14.8 percent of their available gains but only 9.8 percent of their available losses, and that the winners they sold went on to do better than the losers they kept.

Do professional investors show the same biases?

Yes, in institutional forms. Goyal and Wahal (2008) found that US plan sponsors hire managers after strong excess returns and fire them after weak ones, but returns after hiring are indistinguishable from zero, and fired managers often go on to do as well as or better than their replacements.

Can investors profit from other people's biases?

Some return patterns, such as momentum and value, have behavioural explanations, but they are widely known, compete with risk-based explanations and can go through long losing spells. For most institutions the more reliable gain comes from limiting their own biased decisions.

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