Hedge Fund Fees - 2-and-20, Hurdles, and the High-Water Mark
By EC Assets Research Team, Alternatives Research · Published · Updated
Hedge Fund Fees: Alternative-fund fees combine a management fee on assets with a performance fee on profits - the classic '2-and-20'. The high-water mark ensures performance fees are charged only on new profits above a prior peak, and a hurdle rate requires clearing a minimum return first; both are key investor protections.
What Hedge Fund Fees Are
Hedge fund fees have two layers. The management fee is a percentage of assets, charged whatever the results, to pay for staff, research and operations. The performance or incentive fee is a share of the profits. The shorthand 2 and 20, a 2 percent management fee and a 20 percent performance fee, was the standard for decades and remains the template, although most funds now charge less.
The two layers create different incentives. A large management fee rewards gathering assets; a performance fee rewards returns. Agarwal, Daniel and Naik (2009) find that funds with stronger performance incentives, such as higher incentive fees and high-water marks, tend to deliver better performance.
How It Works
Fees are usually accrued in the net asset value and crystallised once a year. In a common convention, the management fee is charged on assets at the start of the year and the performance fee on the gain after the management fee, but only above the high-water mark:
$$\text{Incentive fee} = p \times \max(0,\ \text{NAV after management fee} - \text{HWM})$$
The high-water mark is the highest value on which a performance fee has been paid. After a loss, the fund must recover to that level before the manager earns another performance fee. Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross (2003) show that the high-water mark makes the performance fee behave like a call option held by the manager on the fund's value, worth a substantial share of assets in present-value terms.
A hurdle requires a minimum return, such as a cash rate, before the fee applies. Under a hard hurdle the fee is charged only on returns above it; under a soft hurdle the fee applies to all profits once the hurdle is cleared, sometimes with a catch-up, the mechanism described in the distribution waterfall entry.
Worked Example
A fund starts at 100 with 2 and 20 terms and a high-water mark:
| Year | Gross return | Start value | Management fee | Performance fee | End value | High-water mark |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | +20% | 100.00 | 2.00 | 3.60 | 114.40 | 114.40 |
| 2 | -10% | 114.40 | 2.29 | 0.00 | 100.67 | 114.40 |
| 3 | +15% | 100.67 | 2.01 | 0.00 | 113.76 | 114.40 |
| 4 | +10% | 113.76 | 2.28 | 1.69 | 121.17 | 121.17 |
Management fee on start value; performance fee of 20 percent on the value after the management fee above the high-water mark.
In year 3 the fund gains 15 percent but stays below its high-water mark, so no performance fee is due. Over the four years gross returns compound to 36.6 percent, the investor's value rises 21.2 percent, and fees total 13.87.
Over longer periods the drag compounds. At 8 percent gross a year, 2 and 20 leaves 8 - 2 - 0.2 × (8 - 2) = 4.8 percent net. After 20 years 1 grows to 4.66 gross but only 2.55 net, so the investor keeps about 42 percent of the gross gain. The fee drag calculator shows the same arithmetic for other terms.
When It Applies (and Limitations)
Netting across funds and investors. A high-water mark applies to each fund and often to each investor's units. An investor in several funds can pay performance fees to the winners while bearing losses in the losers, so the effective share of net portfolio profits paid in fees exceeds the headline 20 percent.
Fees can reward volatility. Because the manager shares gains but not losses, a performance fee resembles a call option, and higher volatility raises its value. High-water marks and longer crystallisation periods temper, but do not remove, that incentive.
Resets and new funds. After deep losses some managers close funds and launch new ones without a high-water mark, effectively resetting it.
Fees on unrealised gains. Performance fees crystallise on valuations, not cash. For funds holding hard-to-value assets, fees can be paid on marks that later prove optimistic, and clawbacks are rare in hedge funds.
Equalisation is complex. When investors enter at different times, funds use equalisation or series accounting so that each pays performance fees only on its own gains. The method matters for what each investor actually pays.
Why It Matters for Institutional Investors
Net returns decide. Investors live on net returns; a high-fee fund needs a much higher gross return to beat a cheaper alternative. French (2008) estimates that investors in aggregate pay a substantial share of their returns in the costs of active management.
Paying for alpha, not beta. Performance fees should reward alpha, not market exposure that could be bought cheaply. Hurdles tied to benchmarks, or fee terms that exclude beta, align payment with skill.
Negotiation. Management fee steps for larger commitments, fee breaks for longer lock-ups, founders' share classes and multi-year crystallisation are common levers, and they are part of manager selection. Large allocators often obtain separate share classes or managed accounts with lower fees, which raises the effective cost for smaller investors in the main fund.
Alignment. The fee mix shows what a manager optimises for. A fund whose revenue is dominated by management fees has less incentive to cap assets when capacity runs out.
References
- Goetzmann, W. N., Ingersoll, J. E., & Ross, S. A. (2003). High-Water Marks and Hedge Fund Management Contracts. Journal of Finance, 58(4), 1685-1717.
- Agarwal, V., Daniel, N. D., & Naik, N. Y. (2009). Role of Managerial Incentives and Discretion in Hedge Fund Performance. Journal of Finance, 64(5), 2221-2256.
- French, K. R. (2008). Presidential Address: The Cost of Active Investing. Journal of Finance, 63(4), 1537-1573.
- Lack, S. (2012). The Hedge Fund Mirage: The Illusion of Big Money and Why It's Too Good to Be True. Wiley.
Frequently asked questions
What does 2 and 20 mean?
A management fee of 2 percent of assets a year plus a performance fee of 20 percent of profits. The management fee is paid regardless of results; the performance fee only when the fund makes money, usually above its high-water mark. Many funds now charge less, but the structure remains the template.
What is a high-water mark?
The highest net asset value on which a performance fee has been paid. After a loss, the fund must climb back above that level before any new performance fee is charged, so the manager is paid only on genuinely new profits rather than on recovering earlier losses.
What is a hurdle rate?
A minimum return, such as a fixed percentage or a cash rate, the fund must exceed before a performance fee applies. A hard hurdle charges the fee only on returns above the hurdle; a soft hurdle charges on all profits once the hurdle is cleared. Hurdles are more common in private equity than in hedge funds.
How much of the gross return do fees take?
More than the headline suggests. At an 8 percent gross return a year, 2 and 20 leaves about 4.8 percent net, and over 20 years the investor keeps only about 42 percent of the gross gain, because fees compound against the investor just as returns compound for them.
Why have hedge fund fees fallen?
Because many funds failed to deliver returns that justified them after fees, cheap index and factor products made market exposure inexpensive, and large institutional investors negotiated harder. Lower management fees, higher hurdles, longer crystallisation periods and fee breaks for longer lock-ups have become common.
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