Manager Selection - The Single Most Important Skill in Alternatives

By EC Assets Research Team, Manager Research · Published · Updated

Manager Selection: Manager selection is the institutional discipline of identifying, evaluating, and allocating to investment managers. For alternative investments where manager dispersion exceeds asset-class dispersion, manager selection is the dominant determinant of investor outcomes.

What Manager Selection Is

Manager selection is the process of finding, assessing, appointing, monitoring and, when needed, replacing external investment managers. It runs from sourcing and due diligence through negotiating fees and terms to monitoring and decisions to add to, reduce or end a relationship. For investors in active and alternative strategies it is one of the few decisions fully within their control, and the spread between good and poor managers is typically far wider in private equity, venture capital and hedge funds than in public bond or equity markets.

The difficulty is that the main evidence of skill, past returns, is noisy. Selection that relies on it heavily tends to buy luck and pay for it.

How It Works

Grinold and Kahn (1999) measure skill with the information ratio: active return divided by tracking error. Because returns vary from year to year, the information ratio estimated from a short record is uncertain. The number of years needed for a t-statistic of 2, the usual threshold for statistical confidence, is four divided by the square of the true information ratio.

The behaviour of investors matches the noise. Goyal and Wahal (2008) found that US plan sponsors hired managers after large positive excess returns over the previous three years, but that returns after hiring were indistinguishable from zero, and that sponsors would have done no worse by keeping the managers they fired. The behavioural finance entry explains why this pattern persists.

Persistence differs by asset class. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) found that private equity managers whose previous funds performed well tended to do well again. Harris, Jenkinson, Kaplan and Stucke (2023) find that this persistence has weakened for buyout funds raised since 2000 but remains for venture capital, where access to the best managers is limited. In hedge funds, evidence of persistence is mostly short-term.

Operations matter as much as investment skill. Brown, Goetzmann, Liang and Schwarz (2008) found that operational risk indicators from hedge fund regulatory filings, such as conflicts of interest and past legal problems, predicted fund failure.

Worked Example

The table shows how long it takes to confirm skill, and how often a skilled manager trails its benchmark, for different true information ratios:

True information ratio Years for a t-statistic of 2 Chance of trailing over 3 years Chance of trailing over 10 years
0.25 64.0 33.3% 21.5%
0.50 16.0 19.3% 5.7%
0.75 7.1 9.7% 0.9%
1.00 4.0 4.2% 0.1%

Normally distributed active returns with constant information ratio; chance of a negative cumulative active return over the period.

A manager with no skill at all has a 19.3 percent chance of showing an information ratio above 0.5 over three years, the same chance that a manager with a true ratio of 0.5 has of showing a negative one. A three-year record therefore cannot separate the two. Comparing managers on a ratio bench is useful, but only alongside an understanding of how much noise the record contains.

Real strategies can go further astray. The value factor, which buys cheap stocks and sells expensive ones, earned 5.38 percent a year from 1963 to 2006, with a ratio of return to volatility of 0.59, a level the table suggests would be convincing. It then lost 57.8 percent between December 2006 and September 2020, before earning 7.89 percent a year from 2021 to August 2026. A manager running a sound factor strategy could have been fired near the bottom.

When It Applies (and Limitations)

The statistics are simplified. Real active returns are not normally distributed, information ratios change over time, and private-market returns depend on appraisals and timing of cash flows.

Access is part of the result. In venture capital and top-tier private equity, the best managers often limit new investors, so the question is not only whom to choose but whom one can reach.

Capacity changes outcomes. Managers who grow assets quickly may lose the edge that produced their record.

Qualitative judgement is hard to test. Assessments of people, culture and process are essential but can carry their own biases.

Why It Matters for Institutional Investors

Judge process, not just returns. Written criteria for strategy, team, risk control, alignment of interests and operations reduce dependence on noisy records.

Set expectations in advance. Agreeing how long a mandate will be given, and what would justify ending it, prevents firing at the bottom.

Monitor what can change. Reviews should track the factors behind the original decision, such as team departures, style drift, asset growth and operational changes, so that a decision to stay or leave rests on evidence about the manager rather than on the latest quarter's returns.

Weigh persistence by asset class. Past performance deserves more weight in venture capital than in buyouts or public equities.

Control costs and terms. Fees, liquidity terms and side letters are certain, while alpha is not; negotiating them is a reliable source of value.

References

  1. Grinold, R. C., & Kahn, R. N. (1999). Active Portfolio Management (2nd ed.). McGraw-Hill.
  2. Goyal, A., & Wahal, S. (2008). The Selection and Termination of Investment Management Firms by Plan Sponsors. Journal of Finance, 63(4), 1805-1847.
  3. Kaplan, S. N., & Schoar, A. (2005). Private Equity Performance: Returns, Persistence, and Capital Flows. Journal of Finance, 60(4), 1791-1823.
  4. Harris, R. S., Jenkinson, T., Kaplan, S. N., & Stucke, R. (2023). Has Persistence Persisted in Private Equity? Evidence from Buyout and Venture Capital Funds. Journal of Corporate Finance, 81, 102361.
  5. Brown, S., Goetzmann, W., Liang, B., & Schwarz, C. (2008). Mandatory Disclosure and Operational Risk: Evidence from Hedge Fund Registration. Journal of Finance, 63(6), 2785-2815.
  6. Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (1993). Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds. Journal of Financial Economics, 33(1), 3-56.

Frequently asked questions

What is manager selection?

The process of finding, assessing, appointing, monitoring and, when needed, replacing external investment managers. It covers sourcing, investment and operational due diligence, negotiating terms, ongoing monitoring and decisions to add to, reduce or end a relationship.

Does past performance predict future performance?

Only weakly in most areas. Goyal and Wahal (2008) found no benefit from US plan sponsors' hiring of managers with strong past returns. In private equity, Kaplan and Schoar (2005) found persistence across a manager's funds, but later evidence shows it has weakened for buyouts while remaining in venture capital.

How long a track record is needed to judge skill?

Longer than most investors use. The years needed for a t-statistic of 2 equal four divided by the square of the information ratio: 16 years for an information ratio of 0.5 and 4 years even for an exceptional 1.0. Three-year records are dominated by luck.

What is operational due diligence?

The review of a manager's operations rather than its strategy: valuation, custody, trade processing, compliance, conflicts, cybersecurity and service providers. Brown, Goetzmann, Liang and Schwarz (2008) found that operational risk indicators from hedge fund disclosures predicted fund failure.

When should an investor fire a manager?

When the reasons for hiring no longer hold, for example after key people leave, the strategy drifts, assets grow beyond capacity or operations weaken, rather than after a period of poor returns alone. The evidence on return chasing suggests that firing on returns alone rarely improves results.

Stay informed

Market commentary, firm news and research from EC Assets - direct to your inbox.