Prime Brokerage - The Infrastructure Behind Hedge Funds

By EC Assets Research Team, Alternatives Research · Published · Updated

Prime Brokerage: Prime brokerage is the bundle of bank services - securities lending for shorting, margin financing for leverage, clearing, custody, and capital introduction - that lets hedge funds operate. Concentrating these with one bank creates counterparty risk, the lesson of Lehman in 2008, which drove funds toward multi-prime relationships.

What Prime Brokerage Is

Prime brokerage is the bundle of services that large banks provide to hedge funds and other professional investors. A prime broker lends the securities a fund sells short, lends cash against its positions, clears and settles trades executed with many brokers, holds assets in custody and provides consolidated reporting. Without it, the short selling and leverage at the heart of most hedge fund strategies would not be possible.

The relationship is mutually valuable. The fund gets financing, securities to borrow and operational infrastructure; the bank earns financing spreads, securities lending fees and trading commissions. For any sizeable fund, the choice and number of prime brokers is a central risk decision.

How It Works

Securities lending. The prime broker locates and lends shares for short sales, which underpin long/short equity and much of relative value. Fees are low for easy-to-borrow stocks and high for scarce ones, and lenders can recall shares.

Margin financing. The broker lends cash against long positions and holds the proceeds of short sales as collateral. Each position carries a haircut or margin rate, set by rules or by the broker's risk models, and the sum of these is the fund's margin requirement. Equity above that requirement is the fund's excess margin, its buffer against losses.

Rehypothecation. Collateral posted by the fund may be re-used by the broker to finance itself, lowering costs. In the US, rules limit this to 140 percent of the client's debit balance; other jurisdictions have had no fixed cap. Singh and Aitken (2010) estimate that rehypothecation made a large contribution to collateral circulating in the financial system before 2008.

Synthetic prime brokerage. Instead of holding shares and borrowing against them, a fund can take the same exposure through total return swaps with the broker. Swaps can be cheaper in capital and simpler for cross-border holdings, but the broker, not the fund, holds the underlying shares, and the exposure does not appear in the fund's own share registers.

Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) model the danger: when prices fall, brokers raise margins, forcing funds to sell, which pushes prices further down and margins further up. Funding liquidity and market liquidity reinforce each other in a spiral.

Worked Example

A long/short fund has 100 of equity, longs of 100 and shorts of 50, 150 percent gross. At normal haircuts of 20 percent on longs and 25 percent on shorts, its margin requirement is 0.20 × 100 + 0.25 × 50 = 32.5, leaving 67.5 of excess margin.

In a stressed market the broker raises haircuts to 35 and 40 percent: the requirement rises to 55.0 and excess margin falls to 45.0 before any loss. If the longs then fall 20 percent to 80 and the shorts rise 10 percent to 55, equity drops to 75 and the requirement becomes 0.35 × 80 + 0.40 × 55 = 50.0, leaving 25.0. Another move of similar size would trigger a margin call, and the fund would have to sell into the same falling market.

When It Applies (and Limitations)

Counterparty risk. If the broker fails, assets and financing can be frozen. When Lehman Brothers International (Europe) entered administration in September 2008, hedge funds with assets there, especially rehypothecated assets, waited years for their return.

Terms can change overnight. Margin and financing terms are often at the broker's discretion. Term financing agreements lock them for a period, at a price.

Concentration. A single broker that provides financing, borrow and custody is a single point of failure. Multi-prime arrangements reduce it but add reconciliation and operational complexity, part of sound fund operations.

Swaps can hide concentration. In March 2021 the family office Archegos Capital Management defaulted on concentrated equity swaps held with several banks, none of which saw its full exposure. The banks' combined losses exceeded 10 billion dollars, including about 5.5 billion at Credit Suisse.

Systemic links. Prime brokers finance many funds holding similar positions, so a broker's risk management in stress can force simultaneous deleveraging, as in the losses of convertible and relative value funds in 2008.

Why It Matters for Institutional Investors

Operational due diligence. Which brokers a fund uses, how concentrated it is, its rehypothecation limits and where unencumbered assets are held determine what happens to investors' money if a broker fails.

Leverage resilience. Excess margin, term financing and the diversity of lenders show how well a fund can withstand a stress that raises haircuts, more than its leverage in calm markets.

Cost of financing. Financing spreads, borrow fees and the interest paid on short proceeds can absorb a meaningful share of a leveraged strategy's gross return, so they belong in any assessment of net returns.

Market-wide risk. Investors in several leveraged funds face correlated deleveraging risk through shared prime brokers and similar positions.

Manager quality signal. Careful management of prime relationships, with diversified brokers, negotiated terms and contingency plans, indicates a mature operational and risk culture.

References

  1. Brunnermeier, M. K., & Pedersen, L. H. (2009). Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity. Review of Financial Studies, 22(6), 2201-2238.
  2. Singh, M., & Aitken, J. (2010). The (Sizable) Role of Rehypothecation in the Shadow Banking System (IMF Working Paper No. 10/172). International Monetary Fund.
  3. King, M. R., & Maier, P. (2009). Hedge Funds and Financial Stability: Regulating Prime Brokers Will Mitigate Systemic Risks. Journal of Financial Stability, 5(3), 283-297.
  4. Aikman, J. S. (2010). When Prime Brokers Fail: The Unheeded Risk to Hedge Funds, Banks, and the Financial Industry. Bloomberg Press.

Frequently asked questions

What does a prime broker do?

It provides the services a hedge fund needs to operate: lending securities so the fund can sell short, lending cash against its positions so it can use leverage, clearing and settling trades executed with many brokers, holding assets in custody and providing consolidated reporting. Many also introduce funds to potential investors.

What is rehypothecation?

The re-use by a broker of collateral a client has posted, for example to finance the broker's own borrowing. It lowers financing costs but means the client's assets may be tied up if the broker fails. US rules limit it to 140 percent of the client's debit balance; English law imposed no equivalent cap before 2008, which mattered in Lehman's failure.

Why did Lehman's collapse matter for hedge funds?

Funds whose assets were held with Lehman Brothers International (Europe) in London found them frozen when the firm entered administration in September 2008. Assets that had been rehypothecated became unsecured claims, and returning even segregated assets took years. Funds afterwards spread assets across several prime brokers.

How do prime brokers affect leverage?

They set the haircuts or margin rates on each position, which determine how much a fund can borrow. In stress they can raise margins at short notice, forcing funds to reduce positions in falling markets, one of the channels through which hedge fund deleveraging spreads across markets.

What is a multi-prime arrangement?

Using two or more prime brokers so that no single broker's failure or tightening of terms can freeze all of a fund's assets and financing. It reduces counterparty risk at the cost of more complex operations, such as reconciling positions and margin across brokers.

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