Venture Capital - Power-Law Returns and Stage Investing
By EC Assets Research Team, Private Markets · Published · Updated
Venture Capital: Venture capital invests equity in privately held, early-stage companies with disruptive growth potential. Returns follow a power law: most investments fail or break even, while a small number generate the bulk of fund returns.
What Venture Capital Is
Venture capital provides equity to young companies with the potential for rapid growth, most of them private and many not yet profitable or even generating revenue. It is usually invested through closed-end funds with lives of about ten years, run by general partners who select companies, sit on boards and help them raise further rounds. Investments are staged: seed and early rounds fund a product and its first customers, later rounds fund growth, and returns come from sales to other companies or stock market listings.
Venture capital is often grouped with private equity, but its economics are different. Buyouts improve established businesses with predictable cash flows; venture capital backs companies whose outcomes range from failure to enormous success, with little in between.
How It Works
The distribution of outcomes is highly skewed. A company can fail and return nothing, return roughly what it raised, or grow into a business worth many times the capital invested. Because losses are capped at the investment and gains are not, a fund's result depends on whether it holds one or two very large winners. Fund construction follows: managers typically spread capital across 20 to 40 companies, keep reserves for follow-on rounds in those that succeed, and accept many failures.
Contracts are built for this uncertainty. Venture investors usually buy convertible preferred shares that rank ahead of founders in a sale, carry board seats and protective rights, and release money in stages tied to progress. Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) show how these terms separate cash-flow rights, voting rights and control, shifting control to investors when a company performs poorly and back to founders when it does well.
Fees and the distribution waterfall take a substantial share. Management fees of around 2 percent a year on committed capital mean that only about 80 percent of commitments is invested, and carried interest, usually 20 percent of profits above a preferred return, goes to the manager. Capital arrives through capital calls over several years and returns late, producing a pronounced J-curve.
The record varies by period. Harris, Jenkinson and Kaplan (2014) find that US venture funds strongly outperformed public markets in the 1990s but underperformed for vintages after 2000. Measured returns can also be biased: Cochrane (2005) shows that because valuations are observed mainly when companies raise money or exit, which happens more often after good news, simple averages overstate returns.
Worked Example
An illustrative fund invests equal amounts in 25 companies with these outcomes:
| Investments | Multiple | Proceeds | Share of proceeds |
|---|---|---|---|
| 10 | 0x | 0 | 0.0% |
| 8 | 1x | 8 | 9.5% |
| 4 | 4x | 16 | 19.0% |
| 2 | 10x | 20 | 23.8% |
| 1 | 40x | 40 | 47.6% |
| 25 | Total | 84 | 100.0% |
An illustrative distribution, not a market statistic; proceeds per unit invested in each company.
The portfolio returns 84 on 25 invested, a gross multiple of 3.36x, and the single best company provides almost half of it. Replace that one company with a write-off and the gross multiple falls to 1.76x.
Now add the fund's costs. Of 100 committed, 20 goes on management fees over ten years and 80 is invested. With the winner, the investments return 268.8. The profit of 168.8 exceeds the 8 percent preferred return, compounded over ten years, of 115.89, so the manager earns full carried interest of 33.76, leaving investors 235.04, a net multiple of 2.35x. Without the winner, the investments return 140.8, the profit of 40.8 does not clear the preferred return, no carry is paid, and investors receive 140.80, a net multiple of 1.41x. Treating all payments as made at the start and end of ten years, these correspond to about 8.9 percent and 3.5 percent a year.
When It Applies (and Limitations)
Illustrative numbers. The distribution above shows the mechanics; real distributions differ by stage, sector and period.
Valuation uncertainty. Interim values are set at funding rounds and by managers, and can lag or overstate what companies would fetch in a sale.
Long holding periods. Companies now often stay private for many years, delaying distributions and extending the J-curve.
Cycles. Fundraising, valuations and exit markets move together; funds raised at peaks have often done worse.
Why It Matters for Institutional Investors
Manager selection dominates. Because outcomes depend on a few companies and access to the best managers is limited, manager selection matters more than the decision to invest in the asset class. Harris, Jenkinson, Kaplan and Stucke (2023) find that persistence of fund performance remains strongest in venture capital.
Diversify across vintages. Committing steadily over many years smooths the effect of cycles in valuations and exits.
Plan for the cash flows. Capital calls in early years and distributions much later require liquidity planning over a decade or more.
Understand the sectors. Much venture capital goes to technology, including AI and technology companies, so a venture programme adds concentrated exposure to a few themes.
References
- Gompers, P., & Lerner, J. (2001). The Venture Capital Revolution. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(2), 145-168.
- Harris, R. S., Jenkinson, T., & Kaplan, S. N. (2014). Private Equity Performance: What Do We Know? Journal of Finance, 69(5), 1851-1882.
- Harris, R. S., Jenkinson, T., Kaplan, S. N., & Stucke, R. (2023). Has Persistence Persisted in Private Equity? Evidence from Buyout and Venture Capital Funds. Journal of Corporate Finance, 81, 102361.
- Cochrane, J. H. (2005). The Risk and Return of Venture Capital. Journal of Financial Economics, 75(1), 3-52.
- Kaplan, S. N., & Strömberg, P. (2003). Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts. Review of Economic Studies, 70(2), 281-315.
Frequently asked questions
What is venture capital?
Equity investment in young, high-growth companies, usually private and often not yet profitable, through funds managed by specialist firms. Investors accept that most companies will fail or return little in exchange for the chance that a few become very large.
Why are venture returns so concentrated?
Because a successful young company can grow many times in value while a failed one can only go to zero. A fund's result therefore depends heavily on a handful of exits. In the example in this entry, one investment out of 25 provides almost half of all proceeds.
Do venture funds outperform public markets?
It depends on the period. Harris, Jenkinson and Kaplan (2014) find that US venture funds outperformed public markets strongly in the 1990s but underperformed for vintages after 2000. Reported averages also depend on which funds report, and Cochrane (2005) shows how selection bias inflates measured returns.
Does past performance matter more in venture capital?
Yes, more than in buyouts. Harris, Jenkinson, Kaplan and Stucke (2023) find that venture managers whose previous funds did well continue to outperform, while buyout persistence has weakened. Access to the best managers is limited, which makes relationships and timing important.
How long does a venture investment take to pay off?
Typically many years. Funds call capital over the first few years and successful companies often take seven to ten years or more to reach a sale or listing, so cash returns arrive late and interim valuations dominate early reports, producing a deep J-curve.
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